The Third Grade of Clearness, Pragmatic Definition, and The Pragmatic Method
In “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” (HTM), Charles Sanders Peirce (CSP) presents three “grades of clearness” and advocates for the third grade over the other two. These two grades come from the clear (1) and distinct (2) ideas of Descartes and Leibniz and the third grade is what has come to be known as CSP’s “pragmatic maxim”. For reference, here is CSP’s pragmatic maxim from HTM: “Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.” Next, I will discuss the difference between the pragmatic maxim, pragmatic definitions, and the pragmatic method.
According to CSP, The first grade of clarity (1GC) is intuitive/non-reflective certainty and is roughly synonymous with belief. In other words, 1GC is not agnostic; 1GC is belief. The second grade of clearness (2GC) is not only clear, but also distinct — intuitively certain (1GC) down to component beliefs. 2GC is related to what we usually mean by an essential definition. Traditionally, a definition is a statement of the essential character of a thing in necessary and sufficient conditions. A vixen is a female fox. All female foxes are vixens and only female foxes are vixens. Democracy is rule by the people. Often the terms of a definition can themselves be defined in multiple terms, etc. 2GC is when all these component terms are 1GC as well. Again, belief is built into clarity here.
That is all well and good, but we can still be very wrong and inquiry can get blocked for a variety of reasons (e.g. these definitions/beliefs can become dogma — ossified). That is where the third grade of clearness (3GC) comes in. CSP says that instead of 2GC definitions – which he also calls verbal definitions – we should 3GC, which CSP also calls real definitions. As 3GC is called the pragmatic maxim, I will refer to 3GC definitions as pragmatic definitions. Pragmatic definition changes the terms of the definition from formulating essences to describing effects.
Now let’s look at some of CSP’s examples of pragmatic 3GC definitions in HTM:
hard: “not be scratched by many other substances”
weight: “in the absence of opposing force, it will fall”
force: “if the actual changes of motion which the different particles of bodies experience are each resolved in its appropriate way, each component acceleration is precisely such as is prescribed by a certain law of Nature, according to which bodies in the relative positions which the bodies in question actually have at the moment, always receive certain accelerations, which, being compounded by geometrical addition, give the acceleration which the body actually experiences.”
Unfortunately, CSP doesn’t provide 2GC definitions of these terms for contrast. I have given it a try on multiple occasions and this is what I’ve noticed: they tend to sound circular. Hardness is the body's resistance to pressure. Weight is the body's inertia. I’m not claiming these are adequate definitions, but just cursory attempts. But notice that these definitions have terms that beg to be defined and appear to be largely synonymous with the term defined, making them sound circular. I think CSP has examples in the history of science like the bodily humors, caloric, and phlogiston in mind. Another classic example is that opium has a dormitive virtue. This is circular and doesn’t explain anything. CSP’s pragmatic definitions aim to eliminate the likes of humors and phlogiston. This makes sense, since CSP is presenting in a science journal on the “Logic of Science” and is discussing conceptions in physics, but it certainly can’t hurt to use 3GC more broadly, perhaps universally: focus on the effects.1
Lastly, there is a distinction between the pragmatic maxim, pragmatic definitions, and the pragmatic method. CSP’s statement above is usually called the “pragmatic maxim” which he demonstrates by offering pragmatic definitions of some physical conceptions. William James’ (WJ) account is usually called the “pragmatic method”. The pragmatic method is more explicitly marketed as a tool for analyzing conceptions and dissolving philosophical deadlock (if not all philosophy qua dialectical debate entirely). Rather than go back and forth endlessly on whether the squirrels are going around each other or not, we can agree that they never get behind each other, and be settled with that. Similarly, WJ relays in “The Will to Believe” what “a learned judge” said to him: “few cases are worth spending much time over: the great thing is to have them decided on any acceptable principle, and got out of the way”. In this sense, the pragmatic method can also be seen as advocating minimally reflective action to keep the ball rolling.
This is similar to Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations: “Don't think, but look!”