M: “For they represent no fact to be different from what it is; only they involve arrangements of facts which would be exceedingly maladroit.”
Let M (the 13th letter) stand for the 13th sentence of the first paragraph of section III (FP3) of Charles Sanders Peirce’s (CSP) 1878 “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” (HTM). M requires special attention because M can fairly be considered the central point of FP3 and also contains what I will call the “germ” of the pragmatic method. I think a case can be made that FP3 and M in particular inspired William James in whom these ideas simmered for 20 years until James introduced the world to pragmatism as a method for settling philosophical deadlock. As such, a case can be made that M is the most significant sentence of HTM. In a Periwinkle shell, according to M: between our “present usage” (L) and these modified usages (Q2/Q3), the salient difference is that one is “exceedingly maladroit” and the other is not. In this section I will discuss the fact/arrangement distinction that becomes evident in M and I will also discuss his usage of the word ‘maladroit’.
I will begin this discussion of M from the beginning. The “they” refers to the same thing as “they” in L: cases like Q2 and Q3. Q2 and Q3 both represent no fact to be different from what they are and ever will be. As I’ve discussed above, I think Peirce would say our “present usage of speech” (L) also represents no fact to be different from what they are and ever will be. Peirce identifies effects with meaning. In other words, there is no change or difference in meaning between our present usage and these modified usages—they agree on all and only the same facts. Our “present usage” and Q2/Q3 have the same meaning according to Peirce.
There is a major distinction in HTM that becomes clear in L3 and as it will get in M. Peirce never uses the same term twice in referring to the classes distinguished. In L3 (K–N), Peirce begins using a variety of locutions that all look a little different, are never explicitly equated, but I am all but certain Peirce would use them interchangeably. In K, mentions “modes of speech”. In L Peirce introduces a distinction between “usage[s] of speech” and “meaning”. I assume that Peirce would use “modes of speech” and “usage[s] of speech” interchangeably. “Fact” and “meaning” are also synonymous for Peirce. Thus, in M and N Peirce refers to a distinction between “facts” and “arrangements of facts”. And finally, in section IV Peirce refers to a distinction between “the arrangement of our language” and “the meaning of our ideas”. Finally, I think Peirce considers “meaning” and “facts” to be synonymous with “effects”, as the word occurs in PM and sentence C of FP3. In short, there is one distinction/dichotomy and a bunch of synonyms:
effects (PM) vs modes of speech (K)
meaning (L) vs usages of speech (L)
facts (M/N) vs arrangements of facts (M/N)
meaning of ideas (IV) vs arrangements of language (IV)
There appears to be no reason why Peirce uses such different locutions, other than perhaps he assumed that their identity was obvious and/or he is allowing himself to be unclear for some rhetorical purpose.
M states that arrangements can sometimes be maladroit. Perhaps he assumed it was obvious and not worthy of mention, but Peirce doesn’t explicitly tell us what he means by ‘maladroit’ and what to do when we encounter maladroit conceptions. Not only that, but I think this is the only time he ever uses the word ‘maladroit’. In the spirit of explication, I think Peirce would say that we should discard or drop maladroit questions/considerations. Thus, adapting PM into a practical method of deciding what to do looks something like: if you encounter maladroit conceptions, drop them and move on. Peirce doesn’t explicitly say this, but I believe this is the subtext.
Perhaps ‘maladroit’ was a common word at the time of writing HTM, but I have personally struggled a lot with this word choice. Looking briefly ahead to sentence N, Peirce uses the word ‘perspicuous’ almost in parallel with ‘maladroit’. I interpret this to imply that ‘maladroit’ and ‘perspicuous’ are used as polar opposites. ‘Perspicuous’ is a straightforward synonym for ‘clear’ (“third grade of clearness”, “How To Make Our Ideas Clear”) and I think Peirce would use them interchangeably. Therefore, I think it is safe to assume that ‘maladroit’ is used as the polar opposite of perspicuous/clear.
But the opposite of clear does not resemble common definitions of ‘maladroit’ and I have checked dictionaries from the mid 19th century and the definition has remained consistent. Common definitions of ‘maladroit’ are often just a list of synonyms: clumsy, inept, awkward, bungling, not skillful/dexterous. Imagine an extremely tall person with little cooking experience trying to prepare a complex meal in a compact kitchen. The goal is a fine meal, but the performance will be very maladroit.
I must admit that I don’t know what exactly Peirce means by “maladroit”. I think the semantic center that all the synonyms above gravitate around is: a lack of skill, grace, physical coordination. ‘Maladroit’ seems to center on physical skill: bumbling and bungling, bumping and fumbling. But Peirce says Q2 and Q3 have no results at all — no tests, no results. So Q2/Q3 are not on the spectrum of better and worse effects — no results. Again, the inexperienced tall guy in a compact kitchen produces results, but his performance is maladroit. So there is an apparent mismatch between no effects and the very physical maladroit. Unfortunately, Peirce only uses the word ‘maladroit’ once.
In the case of the gawky novice chef, there is a further question: does ‘maladroit’ refer to the resulting plated dishes or to the process, performance, creation of the dish? In other words: does ‘maladroit’ refer to the performance, the results, or can it refer to either or both? In cases like cooking, there is a preparation and a plating. The plated food is the result. But there are other performances/creations where there isn’t a separate static (at least temporary) result. Performance based art like dance, and especially improvised creation of any form, don’t leave behind an artifact, a static result. My intuition is that ‘maladroit’ is better suited to describing actions and performances, not static things, like a dish of food. The would-be chef produces some results but they fall far from the mark he was aiming at and we are judging him by. We might say that the dish makes me feel awkward sympathetically, but the dish itself isn’t awkward (outside of some very unusual circumstances). In line with this, the results can look immaculate and yet the performance was maladroit. So, there may be a high probability that a maladroit performance will produce maladroit (awkward) results, but there isn’t a necessary connection.
On a more immediate level, in addition to having no distinct effects, Q2 and Q3 are convoluted—contrived. Q2 in order to probe it and it is cumbersome and counterintuitive, so it is effectively maladroit and may be discarded. It is counterintuitive and we must force ourselves to construct these scenarios in our mind because there is a recoil back to something more intuitive. They are a handful and a mouthful. They are awkward and there is a visceral tension and irritation to considering ugly, awkward things. They are unpleasant to consider from the complexity alone; the cushion-diamond case makes me wince a bit when I think about it. So, Peirce could also be saying that ugly, awkward ideas (that make no difference otherwise) should be dropped.
Recall that section III is devoted to applications of PM to conceptions in the physical sciences and FP3 is devoted to applying PM to physical hardness in particular. And recall that Peirce never explicitly answers Q2 and Q3; he pivots to logical interludes that imply answers, but it is never explicit, and he moves on to the next question. In M, Peirce actually uses PM in the form of a practical method for settling doubt.
Thus far in this section, I have discussed some different senses of ‘maladroit’. I will now offer a few thoughts on this. I don’t have a firm interpretation, but just hints. ‘Maladroit’ is a word that is used to describe someone or something’s usefulness—their effectiveness. PM is also in terms of effects: “Consider what effects…” Q2/Q3 have no distinct effects. Perhaps Peirce is using ‘maladroit’ to mean Q2/Q3 are ineffectual, ineffective, without the physical connotation of bumbling and bungling. Again, Peirce doesn’t elaborate. As I have hinted to above, I think there is more going on here beyond ‘maladroit’ as simply synonymous with ineffective. Peirce shows his card here with Q4. Q4 is dismissed through a very different method from this uses a very different method—reductio ad absurdum—and I think this hints to another dimension of maladroit beyond the simply ineffectual.
In summary, FP3 deals with applications of PM, but M (and Q4 next) contain hints of how PM is to be adapted into a practical method. PM is an abstract maxim, a guiding principle. A maxim/principle is similar to an axiom or definition: they are assumptions. The terms may be clarified, but they are an admission of arriving at irreducible grounds. A method tells us what to do when something occurs—if you encounter x, do y. In addition, he doesn’t mention it here or anywhere, when the doubt that disturbed the peace is gone, you return to the previous equilibrium/set of beliefs.